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57 
Former Roberts Court Clerks’ Success Litigating 
Before the Supreme Court 
Adam Feldman* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Former Roberts Court clerks frequently appear before the 
Supreme Court. This Article examines whether former Roberts Court 
clerks have a litigating advantage before their former bosses. The 
main finding is yes, but only under certain circumstances. Generally, 
former Roberts Court clerks have about an even chance of receiving 
votes from the Justices for or against the positions they argue. When 
they argue positions ideologically aligned with their former Justices, 
though, they enhance their chance of success above this fifty percent 
threshold. 
 
 
 
Supreme Court clerkships lead to lifelong bonds between Justices 
and clerks, as well as between the clerks themselves. Take for 
example Justice Brennan’s law clerks. Periodically they would meet 
for a reunion that one clerk described as “a large extended family 
coming together.”1 In this way, clerkships create unique connections 
between individuals in an otherwise extremely well-guarded 
institution. 
 
 *  Adam Feldman is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Empirical Study of Public Law at 
Columbia Law School as well as a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of 
Southern California. I would like to thank Paul Collins and Lee Epstein for their helpful 
comments. 
 1  Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan and His Law Clerks, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 385 
(2014). 
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How well guarded? There are no cameras allowed in the 
courtroom, decisions may be unsigned, and proceedings aside from 
oral arguments are held outside of the public eye. Outside of the 
Justices themselves, Supreme Court clerks are the only group of 
individuals that provide input into Supreme Court decisions. Clerks 
work alongside the Justices, oftentimes helping to choose the cases 
the Court hears, drafting bench memos, and in some instances, 
drafting portions of the Court’s opinions.2 
Current Supreme Court clerkships typically last only a year and 
then the former clerks must decide on their career path. Former 
Supreme Court clerks often can expect large signing bonuses if they 
choose to move into legal practice,3 and for a good reason: they tend 
to graduate the top in their class from the highest ranked law schools 
in the nation.4 Even with signing bonuses exceeding $200,000, 
recently the law firm of Jones Day hired ten former Supreme Court 
clerks to its practice in a single year.5 
Aside from their academic achievements, Supreme Court clerks 
bring to firms the intimate knowledge that they have gained by 
working so closely with a Justice and the Court.6 This knowledge and 
 
 2  See H. W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 43–60 (2009) (providing anecdotal accounts from clerks on their roles in 
helping to choose the cases the Justices grant on writ of certiorari); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID 
L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 3–4 (2006) (describing how the Justices use bench memos to derive questions 
for oral arguments and in conferences when coming to their decisions in the cases); Jeffrey S. 
Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court, 96 
Cornell L. Rev. 1307, 1309 (2010) (describing the Justices’ differing practices regarding the 
extent of opinion drafting that they delegate to their clerks). 
 3  See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 2 (2006) (describing law firm signing 
bonuses for former Supreme Court clerks). 
 4  See Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court 
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 61 (2008) (showing that the 
majority of Supreme Court clerks come from “top-five” law schools). 
 5  See Martha Neil, Jones Day Hires 10 US Supreme Court Clerks, 'A Stunningly Large 
Number,' Law Prof Says, ABA Journal (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jones_day_hires_10_clerks_from_us_supreme_court. 
 6  This potential advantage may function similarly to prior federal judicial experience, 
where we see “circuit effects” in which certain justices are likely to affirm decisions from their 
prior circuits. See Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial 
Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 833, 873 (2009) (“With only a few 
exceptions, Justices who served on the circuits behave in a significantly different manner 
toward their former court relative to all others.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/10
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the insights they may have gleaned on the Court’s inner workings 
make them an invaluable commodity, especially to firms that litigate 
before the Supreme Court. 
This Article assesses whether clerks that served during the 
Roberts Court have a litigating advantage in the Supreme Court. Well 
over 400 individuals have clerked for a Supreme Court Justice since 
John Roberts assumed his post as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.7 As these clerks completed their clerkships, they created a 
large pool of potential attorneys. 
But do these former clerks make for more successful Supreme 
Court litigators? There are several reasons to suspect that the answer 
is yes, including the two I mentioned above. It is also true that the 
Justices chose their clerks out of a large body of potential candidates, 
which may indicate that they were attractive to particular Justices. 
Finally, because many former clerks worked in the cert pool,8 and 
interacted with the Justices in other ways, they had opportunities to 
get to know Justices other than their direct boss.9 
Numerous scholarly articles and books have explored the 
relationship between Supreme Court Justices and their clerks.10 But 
 
 7  See JUDICIAL YELLOW BOOK SERIES; for full list of Supreme Court clerks over time 
see List of Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States, WIKIPEDIA (2017), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_clerks_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_State
s (last visited Jan 5, 2017). 
 8  See Perry, supra note 2 at 42 (describing the cert pool as a system designed to 
aggregate resources of multiple Justices’ chambers to review cert petitions). 
 9  See id. at 56 (providing a clerk’s explanation of how a pool memo is written for an 
audience composed of all of the Justices in the cert pool). 
 10  Several books provide insight into the Justices’ private and work life through 
anecdotes shared by former clerks. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (2011) (providing clerks’ first person accounts of 
working for Supreme Court Justices). While there are a few law reviews articles that examine 
the relationship between Justices and their clerks. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Lowest Form of 
Animal Life?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court History, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 855 
(1999) (reviewing works examining Supreme Court clerks as well as providing additional 
examples of clerks interactions with the Justices); Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd & Amanda 
C. Bryan, Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the US Supreme Court's Agenda-Setting 
Process, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 75 (2014) (examining cert pool memos from the 1986 through 1993 
terms), there are also a handful of political science articles that focus on the role of Supreme 
Court clerks. See, e.g., Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective 
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004) (providing Supreme Court clerks’ assessments 
of amicus briefs); Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization 
in the US Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001) (looking at the relationship between Supreme 
Court judicial ideology and clerk selection based on clerks’ prior clerkships in lower courts). 
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these works tend to focus on the clerks’ background and their service 
on the Court. There is surprisingly little written about life after the 
clerkship.11 Studies examining the success of the U.S. Solicitor 
General (SG) before the Supreme Court,12 may shed light on clerks’ 
potential advantages as litigators. 
On the one hand, because each SG during the Roberts Court years 
clerked for a Supreme Court Justice,13 they, like other former clerks, 
have personal relationships with the Justices.14 Both sets of 
individuals also are entrusted with helping the Justices come to their 
decisions.15 On the other hand, SGs have an institutional advantage as 
litigators that other former clerks lack because they work for the 
federal government.16 This advantage is well-documented, especially 
at the certiorari stage.17 When non-SG former clerks try cases before 
the Court they lack this same institutional connection of the OSG.18 
 
 11  A rigorous search for existing literature on the subject led to only one result. Karen 
O'Connor & John R. Hermann, Clerk Connection: Appearances Before the Supreme Court by 
Former Law Clerks, 78 JUDICATURE 247 (1994) (providing empirical analyses of clerks’ law 
practice before the Supreme Court by looking at the frequency with which former clerks appear 
as counsel). 
 12  See generally infra notes 11–12. 
 13  Paul Clement, Solicitor General from 2004 through 2008 clerked for Justice Scalia, 
Gregory Garre, Solicitor General from 2008 through 2009 clerked for Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Kagan, Solicitor General from 2009 through 2010 clerked for Justice Marshall, Donald Verrilli, 
Solicitor General from 2011 through 2016 clerked for Justice Brennan, and current Solicitor 
General Ian Gershengom clerked for Justice Stevens. 
 14  See, e.g., supra note 1 (depicting Justice Brennen’s former clerks meeting for 
reunions with the Justice); see also Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest 
Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 72, 73 (2005) (describing the S.G.’s 
role as “a unique position amongst the justices”). 
 15  See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 161 
(1992) (describing the importance of trust shared between the Justices and the Solicitor 
General); see also Ward & Weiden, supra note 2, at 207 (mentioning the amount of trust the 
Justices place in their law clerks often epitomized by allowing clerks to draft opinions). 
 16  See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, A Built-in Advantage: The Office of the 
Solicitor General and the US, 66 POL. RESEARCH Q. 454, 462 (2013) (“[w]e believe that OSG 
success likely stems from the office’s longstanding relationship with the Court and with the 
professionalism its attorneys display.”). 
 17  See Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions from 2001-2015, 61 
VILL. L. REV. 795, 828 (2017) (showing the SG’s success rate at cert and how this exceeds the 
success of other experienced attorneys). 
 18  The SG is often referred to as the tenth Justice because of the dual role as advocate 
and as purveyor of information to the Court. See generally SALOKAR, supra note 11. Recent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/10
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Former clerks, especially recent ones, may also lack “repeat player” 
status. Though it is true that many of the repeat players before the 
Roberts Court served as clerks, they may be better known to the 
justices through their many appearances before the Court. Then there 
are the many repeat players who never clerked at the Supreme Court 
level, including former Solicitor General litigator Seth Waxman and 
Supreme Court regular Lisa Blatt.19 The lack of a Supreme Court 
clerkship has not prevented Blatt and Waxman from emerging as two 
of the most successful appellate practitioners and recognized names 
in modern Supreme Court practice. 
Although some of the evidence suggests the possibility of a 
clerkship litigation advantage, the converse may also be true. While 
clerks may have formed a relationship a with their Justice, this 
trusting relationship does not necessarily extend to a bond between 
the former clerk and any of the other Justices. So too, many of those 
who litigate before the Supreme Court are experienced practitioners 
and are already elite attorneys.20 Recent former clerks’ relational 
advantage may be counteracted by the clerk’s lack of practical 
lawyering experience, especially when combined with the experience 
of their opposing counsel. The bottom line is that although a Supreme 
Court clerkship should provide a lawyer with an advantage over a 
similarly situated lawyer without one, the extent of this advantage is 
unclear.   
The sample of cases I analyze consist of instances where former 
Roberts Court clerks (clerking between the 2005 through 2015 
 
law grads may also work in the Department of Justice as Bristow Fellows which can further 
entrench their relationship with both the OSG and the Justices. See Patricia A. Millett, We're 
Your Government and We're Here to Help: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal 
Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209 (2009) (explaining how 
Bristow Fellows are former federal law clerks who are responsible for responding to cert 
petitions where the Department of Justice is the opposing party). 
 19  See People, WILMERHALE, https://www.wilmerhale.com/seth_waxman/ (last 
accessed Mar. 21, 2017); see also People, ARNOLD & PORTER, 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/people/b/blatt-lisa-s (last accessed Mar. 21, 2017). Both Blatt 
and Waxman’s bios mention they clerked at the federal appeals court level—Blatt for then 
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Waxman for Judge Gesell. 
 20  See Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of 
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 89 (1995) (arguing that a lawyer’s 
experience litigating in the Supreme Court is an asset both for understanding the Justices and 
for developing credibility before the Court). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Supreme Court Terms) litigated before the Court during the same 
period.21 This amounts to 137 cases in which Roberts Court clerks 
represented a party on the merits and participating in oral arguments. 
It also creates a diverse sample of representation ranging from 
attorneys from the United States Office of the Solicitor General 
(OSG), attorneys representing city and state government officials in 
states like Texas and cities such as San Francisco, to representatives 
of large corporations such as Teva Pharmaceuticals and Hartford Life 
Insurance. 
I explore whether the Justices voted for the side represented by 
their former clerks. The main finding is that former Roberts Court 
clerks can be quite successful if they properly leverage their 
knowledge of their former bosses. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The population used in this Article’s analysis includes the 
Justices’ votes in the 137 cases in which Roberts Court clerks 
represented parties on the merits through the 2015 Supreme Court 
Term. Therefore, each observation is a Justice’s vote for or against a 
particular former clerk in a case. The main outcome of interest is the 
Justices’ support for former clerks as measured by their votes on the 
merits. 
I also include several control variables that also may explain the 
justices’ votes. To take into account participation OSG, I include the 
variables OSG Against and OSG Backed. OSG Against is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the OSG represented the party opposing the 
former clerk. OSG Backed = 1 if the clerk worked in the OSG. 
The next variable controls for the importance of the case. I include 
this variable on the assumption that in important cases, the Justices 
are less likely to focus on their relationships with former clerks.22 To 
control for importance, the variable Political Salience = 1 in 
instances where the case was mentioned on the front page of the New 
 
 21  Based on an original data collection for this Article. 
 22  This hypothesis is premised on similar findings with different actors. FORREST 
MALTZMAN, JAMES SPRIGGS & PAUL WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000) 36, 37 (showing that the Justices are less likely to be influenced 
by other Justices views in cases deemed important or salient). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/10
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York Times the day after the Court delivered the decision.23  
Beyond case importance, I code for alignment between the 
position taken by the clerk and the justice’s ideological 
predisposition. I include this variable because when a former clerk 
argues a position that does not ideologically align with their former 
employer Justice’s preferences, the former clerk may not fare as well 
as when their preferences align. To measure alignment, I began with 
the Justices’ Martin-Quinn (MQ) Scores by Supreme Court Term.24 I 
coded the ideological position of the litigating former-clerk based on 
the decision direction of the lower court as it appears in the United 
States Supreme Court Database.25 I then looked to see if the 
ideological direction of a Justice’s MQ Score for a Term (negative 
for liberal or positive for conservative) corresponded with the 
ideological direction of the former clerk’s argument. I coded 
Ideological Alignment as 1 when the ideological direction of the 
former clerk and the former clerk’s Justice were the same. I also 
coded Justice of Clerk as 1 when the attorney in an observation 
previously clerked for the Justice whose vote is the object of the 
observation. 
I coded Opponent Clerk as 1 in any situation where the opposing 
counsel in an observation was also a clerk (whether for a Roberts 
Court Justice or prior to Justice Roberts joining the Court). Finally, 
owing to the petitioning party’s inherent advantage from the 
certiorari,26 I code a variable Petitioner as 1 for each instance where 
the clerk in the observation represented the petitioning party. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 23  See generally Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 66 (2000) (creating and validating a measure of case salience). I updated the data 
through the 2015 Term’s cases. 
 24  See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 
(2002) (detailing how the ideal points are generated on a term-by-term basis). 
 25  See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F Spriggs II, The Influence of 
Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 106 (2006) 
(employing this strategy for allocating a policy position to the litigator). 
 26  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 122 (1998) 
(describing “aggressive grant[s]” as a regular practice when the  Justices grant cases on cert 
to reverse lower courts’ decisions on the merits). 
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Clerkships may lead to former clerks’ distinct advantages when 
litigating before their prior employer Justice.27 Based on this 
possibility, prior to analyzing the importance Roberts Court 
clerkships across Justices, I review the relative importance of prior 
clerkships to the Justices by examining the frequency with which 
they voted for their former clerks in the dataset.28 
As there are 123 instances of Justices voting in cases where 
former clerks litigated the cases and the Justices voted for their 
former clerks in sixty-one of these observations, there is an 
approximately 50% support rate. There is substantial variation in both 
the number of cases the Justices heard in this set and in the Justices’ 
relative support rate for their former clerks. Justice Scalia voted in the 
most cases with his former clerks with twenty-five and voted in favor 
of his former clerks in 14, or 56% of these instances. Justice Alito 
had the greatest support rate for his former clerks at 80% but this is 
with only five total observations.  
But we must be very careful in interpreting Table 1. First, for 
many justices the n is so small that the percentages are virtually 
meaningless (a single case could shift them one way or the other); 
and second, the raw data do not control for the many other factors 
that we know affect voting. Table 2 corrects for the latter, displaying 
the results of the multivariate analysis. 
The regression shows predictable results as well as some that may 
be surprising.29 To better understand the regression results, Table 3 
shows the substantive effects of the significant variables. This table 
lists the difference in the likelihood that a Justice will vote for the 
clerk of interest in the observation based on the presence of the 
attribute in the variable (e.g. whether the clerk was the petitioner in a 
case or not). To calculate these values all other variables aside from 
the variable of interest are set to their mean values. Since the values 
for the substantive effects only show the likelihood of the variable’s 
 
 27  See, e.g., supra note 6. 
 28  This analysis includes 123 observations as the remaining observations do not have a 
vote from the clerk’s Justice in the case. This includes instances such as with Justice Stevens’ 
and Souter’s clerks where the Justices were already retired but their former clerks tried cases in 
the observation or when a former Justice hired the clerk to the Court. 
 29  The significance levels remain the same when clustering by issue area instead of 
clustering by Justice. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/10
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effects within a range of error that differs by variable, the 95% 
confidence intervals also provided in Table 3 bound a range of 
possible values for the variables’ effects with 95% confidence of their 
accuracy. 
Looking at these variables’ effects, OSG Against’s negative 
significance conveys that the when one of these attorneys opposed 
the OSG, the likelihood that a Justice would vote for them declined. 
Since OSG Backed and OSG Against are mutually exclusive, they 
cannot both occur in the same case. Thus, in cases where OSG 
Against is coded as 1, the OSG cannot support the clerk in the 
observation.  
The one unexpected finding is the negative significance of OSG 
Backed. The Justices often vote in favor of positions held by the 
OSG.30 This likely shows that based on the high quality of the non-
former clerk litigators in this sample, there is no visibly added benefit 
to garnering the OSG’s support.   
Legal Salience is significant in the negative direction. This shows 
that when dealing with more important cases, the Justices were less 
likely to vote in favor of former clerks’ positions. By contrast, 
Petitioner is positive and significant, as predicted. 
An important finding from this model is that Ideological 
Alignment is significant and moves in a positive direction. This 
shows that the Justices were more likely to vote for former clerks’ 
positions when the clerks’ arguments were ideologically aligned with 
their former employer Justices’ preferences. Estimating the 
substantive effects based on whether or not the former clerk argued 
the position ideologically aligned with the preferences of their former 
employer Justice presents another interesting finding. The likelihood 
that a Justice would vote for the former clerk increased from 51 to 
56% when the clerk argued an ideological position that aligned with 
the former clerk’s Justice. 
Although the finding that ideological compatibility is correlated 
with a Justice’s vote is not unique to clerks, it is unique as a factor 
motivating the Justices to vote in favor of a particular litigant. 
The findings for a logit regression of petitioner success in a 
 
 30  See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U. S. Supreme 
Court, 51 POL. RESEARCH Q. 505 (1998). 
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selection of 134 cases (which corresponds to 1,205 Justices’ votes) 
from the 2013–2015 Terms led to much more predictable results and 
provide a point of comparison. 
Here while Ideological Alignment is also positive and significant, 
so is OSG Backed. The different drivers of Justices’ votes when 
former clerks are litigators highlights the singular importance of 
ideological computability in such instances. 
DISCUSSION 
Former Roberts Court clerks are frequent litigators before the 
Supreme Court as they appeared in 134—or 18%—of the 757 
Supreme Court cases that were orally argued and where signed, 
written opinions were issued during the time period examined in this 
Article. This Article examined the unique question of whether former 
Roberts Court clerks have a litigating advantage before the Roberts 
Court Justices. Using an original measure to test this relationship, the 
main finding is yes, but only under certain circumstances. Former 
Roberts Court clerks tend to have a near-even chance of receiving 
votes from the Justices for or against the positions they argue, even 
when they work within the OSG—an institution that typically leads 
to higher rates of litigant success. Only when they argue positions 
ideologically aligned with their former Justices do they enhance their 
chance of success above this 50% range. 
Two questions remain for future research. First, why does this 
ideological component make a difference when other factors (such as 
OSG support) that lead to litigation advantages do not? Second, how 
can former clerks leverage their personal knowledge of the Justices to 
their advantage? Looking at what clerks learn through the clerkship 
process may provide a potential answer. Clerks gain specific insight 
about how their former bosses reason and think. This may make for 
more effective arguments when they litigate similar positions before 
the Justices. If this is the case, learning the effective construction of 
these particular arguments may be one of the greatest benefits former 
clerks receive from clerking for a Roberts Court Justice. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/10
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Table 1 Justices’ Voting Support for Former Clerks 
Justice Votes  
for Clerk 
Clerk 
Appearances 
with Justice 
Vote for Clerk 
Rate 
Stevens 2 5 0.40 
O’Connor 0 0 NA 
Scalia 14 25 0.56 
Kennedy 6 17 0.35 
Souter 0 1 0.00 
Thomas 13 20 0.65 
Ginsburg 7 17 0.41 
Breyer 9 16 0.56 
Roberts 6 13 0.46 
Alito 4 5 0.80 
Sotomayor 0 4 0.00 
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Table 3: Substantive Effects of Key Variables with 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
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